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Abstract. Communicative feedback in dialogue is an important mechanism that
helps interlocutors coordinate their interaction. Listeners pro-actively provide feed-
back when they think that it is important for the speaker to know their mental state,
and speakers pro-actively seek listener feedback when they need information on
whether a listener perceived, understood or accepted their message. This paper
presents first steps towards a model for enabling attentive speaker agents to deter-
mine when to elicit feedback based on continuous assessment of their information
needs about a user’s listening state.
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1 Introduction
Much work has been directed towards producing ‘active listening’ behaviours in virtual
conversational agents. Virtual agents, however, often also come to contribute and provide
information in the role of the speaker in dialogue. In previous work, we described abilities
that conversational agents need in order to be ‘attentive speakers’ [5]. Such agents
should be able to attend to and to interpret multimodal communicative feedback (short
verbal/vocal expressions such as ‘uh-huh,’ ‘okay,’ etc., head gestures, facial expressions
and gaze) from their users. They should then be able to make inferences, based on these
feedback signals, reason about the users’ listening-related mental state and to adapt
their ongoing utterances to the users’ specific needs. If the evidence and information
is insufficient, e.g., because a user is not a very active listener and gives only limited
informative feedback, attentive speaker agents should also seek user-feedback pro-actively.
That is, they should elicit communicative feedback from their users whenever knowledge
of a user’s state of dialogue processing might be helpful to their (the agent’s and the
user’s) ‘joint project’ [7].
In this paper, we propose that one factor in determining when to elicit feedback from
users is an agent’s ‘information needs.’ Effective communicators tailor their utterances
to their addressees, and want to make sure that their message is conveyed optimally at
any point in time. The assumption is that an agent has a good understanding of how
a message is likely to be received by the interaction partner. At given points in the
dialogue, the agent may be sufficiently certain of a user’s listening-related mental state.
In these cases, additional feedback by the user might not actually be informative. In other
situations, however, the agent’s uncertainty about a user’s listening state may not warrant
well-grounded choices in language generation, or may even be completely unknown.
Furthermore, when choices for strategies and mechanisms for adaptive generation are
limited, the agent needs to know in which – of a number of the states it knows how to deal
with – a user can most likely be found. Given that such information needs occur, eliciting
feedback from the user is one strategy to ensure and achieve an effective dialogue.
We present first steps towards a model that enables virtual conversational agents to
determine when to elicit feedback by assessing their information needs about a user’s
mental state when processing an utterance. After reviewing research on feedback elicita-
tion and explaining our current approach to modelling a user’s listening-related mental
state in Sect. 2, we present an extension of a model that captures the temporal dynamics of
this process during ongoing utterances in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we then discuss approaches
to utilising this dynamic model to quantify an attentive speaker agent’s information
needs and give an example of how these needs evolve over time in a simulated dialogue
situation. Finally, in Sect. 5, we discuss the proposed model and conclude this paper.
2 Background
2.1 Feedback Elicitation
An assumption commonlymade in research on backchannels and communicative feedback
is that listeners in dialogue produce feedback, at least partly, in response to behavioural
‘elicitation cues’ by their interaction partners1. These cues have been analysed extensively.
It has been found that acoustic features [9, 12, 22], syntactic information [9, 12], gaze [3],
as well as head gestures [10] play a role in eliciting feedback responses from listeners.
The mechanism used to identify feedback elicitation cues used in these studies, however,
is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, only cues that were actually followed by listener
feedback were analysed (i.e., only those cues to which listeners responded). Secondly,
speech that preceded listener feedback signals was assumed to contain a cue (i.e., the
possibility that the listener produced the feedback signal without being cued by the
speaker is not allowed). Consequently, these types of analyses miss some of the cues
that speakers actually produced, while categorising behaviours as a cue that were not
intended as such.
These problems have been addressed by having multiple listeners respond to the
same speaker behaviour in either a ‘parasocial interaction’ setting [11] or by creating the
illusion of being in a one-on-one interaction with the speaker for more than one listener
simultaneously [13]. These methods seek to remedy the first problem by increasing the
range of available cues (different listeners responding to different cues). Similarly, the
second problem may be remedied by clustering feedback (places in the speaker’s speech
that are followed by feedback signals from multiple listeners are more likely to contain a
cue). Nevertheless, the form-features in feedback elicitation cues have proven informative
enough to enable automatic detection of feedback elicitation cues in audiovisual data-
streams and have been successfully used to model the feedback behaviour of virtual
agents [17, 20].
1 It should be noted that communicative feedback serves functions for listeners as well, e.g., they
can signal comprehension problems early on so that speakers can address them before they get
worse.
A different line of research has shown that conversational agents producing synthetic
feedback elicitation cues while speaking, received feedback responses from their human
interaction partners. Elicitation cues were either generated using an HMM-based speech
synthesis system trained on a corpus of acted speech containing elicitation cues at
interpausal unit (IPU) boundaries [15, 16], or by adding prosodic and non-verbal cues to
the behaviour repertoire of a virtual agent [18].
What is not proposed by either of these two approaches – nor in the literature on
feedback – is a theory of when and why speakers produce feedback elicitation cues. Em-
pirically, this is due to the problems involved in identifying elicitation cues as described
above. From a theoretical point of view, cues are produced at different levels of inten-
tionality. They can be fully intentional, e.g., when the speaker wants to know whether
the listener understood what was said. They can also be produced by convention, e.g.,
by inviting a backchannel at the end of an IPU. Additionally, they can also occur purely
coincidentally, e.g., a breathing pause by the speaker might be taken as a backchannel
opportunity. In the following, we will concentrate on intentional feedback elicitation
cues strategically produced by speakers with the aim of obtaining more – possibly new
– information about their listeners’ state of understanding (i.e., cues produced out of
‘information needs’), most likely to reduce the uncertainty about the state of the dialogue.
2.2 Attributed Listener State
Another common assumption is that communicative feedback and backchannels are
one and the same, and that listeners, when giving feedback, merely communicate that
speakers can continue speaking. Under this assumption, it would be sufficient for feedback
elicitation cue placement to be governed by simple rules. Backchannels are, however, just
one type of feedback (termed a generic listener response by Bavelas and colleagues [2]).
Feedback signals can be much richer in their form [21] and often fulfil specific functions
[2] that go beyond the backchannel. By strategically placing feedback elicitation cues in
a turn, speakers can thus use them as a way of querying information from listeners.
According to Allwood and colleagues, listeners use feedback to communicate whether
they are in contact with the speaker, whether they are willing and able to perceive what
the speaker is saying, or whether they are willing and able to understand the speaker’s
message. They also convey attitudinal reactions such as acceptance or agreement with the
speaker’s message [1]. As such, listeners partially reveal their mental state – the ‘listener
state’ [5, 14] – which in turn allows speakers to reason about possible communication
problems and common ground, and provides a basis for repair processes and adaptation
of language to the listeners’ needs. Based on this listening state, we proposed earlier [5,
6] that an attentive speaker agent should maintain an ‘attributed listener state’ (ALS)
about its dialogue partners that tracks their actual listener state based on an interpretation
of their feedback behaviour and the dialogue context.
This ALS is modelled probabilistically as a Bayesian network consisting of five
variables 퐶 , 푃 ,푈 ,퐴퐶 ,퐴퐺. These variables represent whether the speaker agent believes
the listener to be in contact, and whether it believes the listener to perceive, understand,
or accept an utterance and to agree with its proposition, respectively. See Figure 1 –
either the left or the right time slice – for a simplified graphical depiction of the model.
The domain of each of the ALS-variables consists of three elements: low, medium, and
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Fig. 1. Dynamic version of the Bayesian network model of the listener [6]. Posterior distributions
of attributed listener state variables 퐶 , 푃 , 푈 , 퐴퐶 , 퐴퐺, 퐺푅 calculated at time 푡푖 are taken as priorfeedback [19] at time 푡푖+1 and influence their corresponding variables 퐶 ′, 푃 ′, 푈 ′, 퐴퐶 ′, 퐴퐺′, 퐺푅′.
high, and represent whether the listener’s understanding (for example) is believed to
be low, medium, or high, respectively (see [6] for details). A probability assigned to
this element (e.g., 푃 (푈 = high) = 0.3) is interpreted as a speaker’s degree of belief that
a listener’s understanding is high. A probability distribution over this variable (e.g.,
푃 (푈 = low) = 0.2, 푃 (푈 = medium) = 0.5, 푃 (푈 = high) = 0.3) is thus considered to be
a speaker’s belief state about this variable.
The ALS-variables influence each other according to the hierarchy of feedback
functions [1] and are influenced by variables that model the listener’s behaviour, the
speaker’s utterances and expectations as well as the dialogue situation (for simplicity these
factors are collapsed in the boxes ‘feedback’ and ‘context’ in Figure 1; see [6] for details).
This allows for a context-sensitive interpretation of the listener’s feedback behaviour.
Furthermore, the five ALS-variables contribute to an inference about the grounding
status of the utterance (퐺푅) thus interpreting the listener’s feedback as ‘evidence of
understanding’ [8].
3 Temporal Dynamics of Attributed Listener State
A limitation in Buschmeier and Kopp’s [6] Bayesian model of attributed listener state
is that it analyses feedback signals and their dialogue context at independent intervals
(increments of the speaker’s utterance similar to intonation units). Listener state attribution
is repeated for subsequent increments of the utterance [4], but information from previous
increments is not carried over. Thus, the model assumes that a listener’s mental state at a
point 푡푖 is independent from – i.e., has no influence on – the mental state at a subsequentpoint at time 푡푖+1.This assumption is a considerable simplification. Consider a case where a listener
does not provide feedback at a given interval. The model either needs to maintain the
last belief state where feedback occurred (which becomes implausible when feedback
is absent for several intervals) or immediately change to a default belief state (which
is implausible if the previous belief state was decidedly positive or negative). A more
plausible assumption would be a combination of these two behaviours, i.e., neither
maintaining the last belief state indefinitely nor changing abruptly, but instead developing
slowly and continuously from the last towards a default belief state. This behaviour would
capture the intuition that listeners that understand well can be assumed to still have a good
understanding even when not providing feedback for a certain period of time. If, however,
feedback is absent for extended periods of time, the belief in their high understanding
will vanish over time.
In order to track how a listener’s mental state changes over time, we extend the static
model of attributed listener state [6] to include a temporal dimension. This is achieved
by transforming it into a two time-slice dynamic Bayesian network (see Figure 1). In this
network, one slice represents the current point in time 푡푖+1, and the other slice representsthe preceding point in time 푡푖. Temporal influences are modelled by linking some of thevariables at time-slice 푡푖+1 with variables at time-slice 푡푖: The five ALS-variables 퐶 , 푃 ,
푈 , 퐴퐶 , and 퐴퐺 as well as the groundedness variable 퐺푅 at time 푡푖 serve as temporallypersistent variables and are directly linked to their counterparts at time 푡푖+1 (퐶 ′, 푃 ′,
푈 ′, 퐴퐶 ′, 퐴퐺′, and 퐺푅′). Thus 푃 ′, for example, is not just influenced by 퐶 ′, listener
feedback and dialogue context, but also by 푃 .
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Fig. 2. Temporal dynamics of the speaker’s degrees of belief in the ALS-variables 푃 , 푈 , and퐴퐶 in
three simulated feedback conditions. Dotted vertical lines visualise verbal-vocal listener feedback.
(a) the listener does not provide feedback and looks away from the speaker; (b) the listener provides
understanding feedback at 푡2 and 푡3, expressing a high certainty at 푡3 and additionally gazing at thetarget object at 푡3 and 푡4, at 푡6 the listener provides acceptance feedback; (c) the listener providesnegative perception feedback at 푡5 and gazes at the speaker at 푡6.
Development over time is modelled with a step-by-step unrolling of the network. At
each step, Bayesian network inference is carried out on time-slice 푡푖, and the resultingmarginal posterior probabilities of the temporally persistent variables are calculated.
Since the network makes a first order Markov assumption, previous time slices are not
considered further. Links to them, as well as to non-persistent variables are cut off. The
calculated posterior distributions are then used as ‘prior feedback’ ([19]; i.e., simply
interpreted as prior distributions of those variables that are used as evidence nodes) to the
subsequent time slice 푡푖+1). The ALS-variables in time-slice 푡푖 thus implicitly representthe history.
To demonstrate how this model simulates the temporal dynamics of the attributed
listener state, Figure 2 shows three simulated examples of ten time steps each (only the
variables 푃 , 푈 , and 퐴퐶 are plotted). Each graph shows how the probabilities for each
of the different values of the respective variables change over time (magenta coloured
lines show 푃 (푋 = low), yellow coloured lines 푃 (푋 = medium) and cyan coloured lines
푃 (푋 = high) for 푋 ∈ 푃 ,푈,퐴퐶).
Figure 2a shows an interaction where the listener does not produce any feedback and
even looks away from the speaker (these behaviours are fed into the input nodes). Over
time, the degree of belief in the listener’s ability and willingness to perceive quickly
shifts from an initial guess of medium towards low perception. Similar shifts can be
observed in the belief states of the listener’s willingness and ability to understand and
accept the speaker’s message.
Figure 2b shows a more complex interaction in which the listener provides under-
standing feedback from 푡2 to 푡3, expressing high certainty at 푡3, and additionally gazes atthe target object in the visual domain at 푡3 and 푡4. Additionally, the listener provides ac-ceptance feedback at 푡6. As soon as feedback occurs, a medium to high level in perceptionand understanding becomes more likely. This level persists even when no feedback occurs
at 푡5. Acceptance, however remains low, as feedback of the type indicating understandingis a sign of not accepting the message [1]. As soon as the listener provides acceptance
feedback at 푡6, a large shift in the belief state of the listener’s willingness and ability toaccept happens, also impacting understanding and perception.
Finally, Figure 2c shows the temporal dynamics of the ALS when a listener provides
negative perception feedback at 푡5, and gazes at the speaker. Similarly to the example inFigure 2a, the belief state in the listener’s ability and willingness to perceive, understand
and accept shifts frommedium towards low and the listener’s negative perception feedback
further strengthens this judgement.
4 Modelling the Speakers’ Information Needs
Our assumption for modellingwhen speakers elicit feedback is that they do so in situations
where they have specific ‘information needs’ that can be fulfilled by listeners by providing
feedback (Sect. 2.1).When seeking to identify these information needs, both the attributed
listener state at the current point in time, as well as how it developed into this state, are
relevant. We propose the following three criteria for assessing whether an agent has an
information need. It needs feedback from the user when
1. its belief about the user’s mental state is not very informative (i.e., when the attributed
listener state has high entropy);
2. its belief about the user’s mental state is static over an extended period of time (i.e.,
when no feedback was received); or
3. its belief about the user’s mental state is different from a desired mental state (e.g.,
sufficient understanding, high agreement) that is intended as the result of a specific
communicative action by the agent or interactive adaptation in a previous utterance
(i.e., when the attributed listener state diverges, by a given degree, from a given
‘reference’ state).
A maximal uncertainty about the mental state of a user would manifest in a uniform
probability distribution across the elements of (one or more) variables, e.g., when 푃 (푈 =
low) = 0.33,푃 (푈 =medium) = 0.33,푃 (푈 = high) = 0.33. Conversely, uncertainty would
be minimal in a maximally pointed distribution such as, e.g., 푃 (푈 = low) = 0.0,푃 (푈 =
medium) = 0.0,푃 (푈 = high) = 1.0. This way of measuring uncertainty, i.e., related to
entropy, assumes that the underlying state of the user is of a discrete nature, rather than
fuzzy and with considerable variance persisting over time. We therefore combine the first,
entropy-based, criterion with an operationalisation of the third criterion by quantifying
the distance between the probability distributions of the current state of a variable and
a ‘reference state’ such as, for example, a state that represents very good or very bad
understanding. This difference can be measured by the Kullback-Leibler divergence
퐷퐾퐿(푃 ||푄) =∑
푖
푃 (푖) ⋅ ln 푃 (푖)
푄(푖)
which returns a scalar value greater or equal to zero, with 퐷퐾퐿(푃 ||푄) = 0 for 푃 =푄,i.e., the more similar the two distributions are, the smaller the KL-divergence.
Figure 3 shows an example of how the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the cur-
rent ALS-variables and a reference state of these variables (one for positive:푃 (푃∕푈∕퐴퐶 =
low) = 0.001,푃 (푃∕푈∕퐴퐶 =medium) = 0.3,푃 (푃∕푈∕퐴퐶 = high) = 0.69; one for nega-
tive perception/understanding/acceptance: 푃 (푃∕푈∕퐴퐶 = low) = 0.69,푃 (푃∕푈∕퐴퐶 =
medium) = 0.3,푃 (푃∕푈∕퐴퐶 = high) = 0.01) changes over time (b), alongside the tem-
poral dynamics of the ALS-variables P, U, and AC themselves (a). The listener gives
positive understanding feedback at 푡1 and gazes near the target object until 푡2. No morefeedback is received after this. The plots of the KL-divergence show that understanding
is believed to be mediocre with a tilt towards low understanding and with some volatility
at the beginning when feedback was received. The difference between the distributions
of the variable 푈 and the positive and negative reference distributions is not very large,
however. In contrast, perception clearly changes toward low, and acceptance is believed
to be low almost from the beginning. The KL-divergence with the negative reference
distributions is almost 0.
Based on this, we can determine the speaker’s information needs by looking for points
where (1) the KL-divergence to a ‘positive’ reference distribution (representing an ALS
with sufficient certainty and positive listener attributes) has a value higher by a given
amount 훼 than what is desired (criterion 3),
퐷푡퐾퐿(pdf(푃∕푈∕퐴퐶), [0.01,0.3,0.69]) > 훼, 훼 = 1.0
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Fig. 3. (a) Temporal dynamics of the speaker’s degrees of belief in the ALS-variables P, U, and AC
in a simulated feedback condition where the listener provides understanding feedback of medium
certainty at 푡1 (visualised by the dotted vertical line), simultaneously gazing near the target objectuntil 푡2. (b) Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distribution of the ALS-variables and thepositive/negative reference distributions. (c) Entropy of the ALS-variables. The solid vertical line at
푡6 visualises a condition where the speaker can elicit feedback. Dashed lines show how the speaker’sdegrees of belief would develop when the listener immediately responds with non-understanding
feedback of medium certainty while gazing towards the speaker.
and (2) where changes in the KL-divergence from one step to the next are smaller than a
given value 훿, i.e., when the values converge and the belief state becomes almost static
(criterion 2):
퐷푡−1퐾퐿(pdf(푈 ), [0.01,0.3,0.69])−퐷푡퐾퐿(pdf(푈 ), [0.01,0.3,0.69]) < 훿, 훿 = 0.1
These can be regarded as points where a speaker requires new information in order to
know how to deal with the dialogue situation. This principle is applied to the example in
Figure 3 to determine a point in time to elicit feedback. The criteria match at time 푡6 with
훼 = 1.03 and 훿 = 0.077 and result in a feedback elicitation cue being produced. Figure 3
also visualises the contrast in the development of the belief state in two situations: when
the feedback elicitation cue is responded to by the listener with negative understanding
feedback (solid lines), or when the elicitation cue does not result in feedback behaviour
by the listener (dashed lines).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented further steps towards creating attentive speaker agents
that take into account their users’ listening-related mental state, even while they are
presenting information and making contributions to the dialogue. We have described an
extension to our attributed listener state model [6] which enables it to deal with aspects
of the temporal dynamics inherent to dialogue. The resulting dynamic Bayesian network
keeps track of a listener’s contact, perception, and understanding, as well as acceptance
and agreement of the speaker agent’s utterances. One goal here is to utilise this model
to assess the information needs a speaker agent faces when it seeks to be cooperative
in dialogue. When information about a user’s mental state is insufficient or hints to
upcoming problems that may lead to undesirable dialogue states (e.g., necessitating
repair), the attentive speaker agent may use this information to decide when to elicit
communicative feedback from the user in order to improve its own information basis and
therefore take appropriate cooperative action.
We are currently implementing the model in a virtual conversational agent to enable
user studies that can not only inform further development of the model, but also elucidate
the coordination mechanisms required for attentive and pro-active dialogue agents.
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